Incumbency advantage and candidate characteristics in open-list proportional representation systems: Evidence from Indonesia by DETTMAN, Sebastian Carl et al.
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences 
1-2017 
Incumbency advantage and candidate characteristics in open-list 
proportional representation systems: Evidence from Indonesia 
Sebastian Carl DETTMAN 
Singapore Management University, sdettman@smu.edu.sg 
Thomas B. PEPINSKY 
Jan H. PIERSKALLA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research 
 Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Political Science Commons 
Citation 
DETTMAN, Sebastian Carl, PEPINSKY, Thomas B., & PIERSKALLA, Jan H..(2017). Incumbency advantage 
and candidate characteristics in open-list proportional representation systems: Evidence from Indonesia. 
Electoral Studies, 48, 111-120. 
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/3124 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional 
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School 
of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. 
For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg. 
 1 
 
 
Incumbency advantage and candidate characteristics in open-list proportional 
representation systems: Evidence from Indonesia 
Sebastian Dettmana 
Thomas B. Pepinskya 
Jan H. Pierskallab 
 
a Department of Government, Cornell University, USA 
b Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University, USA 
 
 
Published in Electoral Studies, Volume 48, August 2017, Pages 111-120 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2017.06.002  
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License 
Accepted version 
 
 
Abstract 
We use evidence from Indonesia’s April 2014 legislative elections to study the relationship between 
incumbency, list position, candidate characteristics, and electoral success in open-list PR systems. Contrary to 
a recent literature identifying an incumbency disadvantage in other large developing democracies, we identify 
a consistent personal incumbency advantage in Indonesia. However, we argue that this advantage is mediated 
by party choices over how incumbents and newcomers are ranked on party lists, a key heuristic for voters in 
low-information electoral environments such as Indonesia. 
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1. Introduction 
Incumbent legislators and their parties face difficult choices in open-list PR systems. Candidates have a strong 
incentive to cultivate a personal vote (Carey and Shugart, 1995), and incumbency provides critical advantages 
in doing so. Yet in open-list PR systems, the sheer length of party lists presents a daunting challenge for both 
incumbents and challengers seeking to stand out. Parties therefore can play a key role in candidates’ electoral 
fortunes in assembling the electoral list, since list position is a common heuristic for voters in low-information 
environments (Miller and Krosnick, 1998). Recent studies of incumbency advantage in new democracies and 
under PR systems have provided more nuance to the incumbency advantage literature, concluding that it is 
conditional on small district size or that incumbency actually places candidates at a disadvantage (Golden and 
Picci, 2015; Moral et al., 2015, Klašnja and Titiunik, 2017). However, it remains difficult to disentangle 
personal incumbency effects from other candidate characteristics and parties’ strategic behavior in 
determining candidates’ list positions, which may both reflect anticipated incumbent electability and 
independently determine their electoral fortunes. 
In this article we do so by examining the relationships between incumbency, list position, candidate 
characteristics, and electoral success in democratic Indonesia. We introduce a unique dataset that includes 
detailed work histories and educational backgrounds of all 6606 candidates contesting in the 2014 elections 
for the Indonesian lower house, the People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, or DPR). 
April 2014 marked the fourth time that Indonesians voted in national legislative elections since the country’s 
transition to democracy that began in 1998, and Indonesia’s elections are one of the largest single day 
elections in the world (The Wall Street Journal, 2014). 
We use these data to establish several facts about incumbency and electoral success in Indonesia. We find 
evidence of a significant electoral incumbency advantage in Indonesia’s open-list PR system. This 
incumbency advantage influences both candidate ranking on their party’s list and their subsequent electoral 
fortunes. We find that incumbency predicts list position: incumbents tend to rank lower on party lists than do 
challengers. (Throughout this article, we adopt the convention that “low” party list positions are the highly 
sought after positions at the top of the list, which correspond to the lowest number in the rank order of the 
candidates on the list.) We also find that list position magnifies the effects of incumbency. Lower ranked 
incumbents perform significantly better than do low ranked challengers. However, in higher list positions, 
incumbents and challengers fare equally. We also find that independent of incumbency, other candidate 
characteristics matter for list position: men, younger candidates, and highly educated candidates tend to earn 
lower list positions. Nevertheless, incumbency is also positively associated with vote share independently of 
list position. While female candidates experience a penalty in general, being an incumbent can mitigate those 
losses: we estimate that female candidates experience a gender penalty of 0.5 percentage points in vote share, 
but incumbents gain 2.66 percentage points in vote share. 
Our explanation for incumbency advantage in Indonesia’s open-list PR system relies on both an institutional 
and an informational mechanism. Incumbents are able to secure a better position in their party’s slate of 
candidates, allowing them to benefit from the key voting heuristic of list position. But incumbents also have a 
personal advantage among a crowded field of candidates – possibly generated through name recognition, and 
ability to marshal resources of office for both aboveground and illicit methods of cultivating their 
constituencies. While open-list PR has been identified as weakening the role of partisanship – since candidates 
are incentivized to cultivate a personal, not party reputation – parties nevertheless play an important 
gatekeeping role in placing candidates in coveted list positions. 
These findings make two contributions to the growing literature on incumbency under proportional 
representation. Extending work by Shair-Rosenfield (2012), this manuscript documents and quantifies 
incumbency effects in Indonesia, the world’s third most populous democracy. In contrast to recent work on 
non-Western democracies (Linden, 2004, Uppal, 2009, Macdonald, 2014, Moral et al., 2015, Klašnja and 
Titiunik, 2017), we find that much like elections in advanced industrial democracies, there is a personal 
incumbency advantage in Indonesian elections as well. The second contribution is empirical. Data on the 
personal characteristics of both challengers and incumbents are rare, particularly outside Western cases. Our 
data allow us to evaluate how electoral arrangements – in this case, the open-list system and party control over 
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list position – interact with personal incumbency and other personal characteristics. We find that incumbency 
matters for list position as well as for electoral outcomes. 
2. Institutions and incumbency 
The large literature on incumbency has its roots in the study of the US Congress, but recent literature has 
applied its insights to developing democracies (e.g. Linden, 2004, Uppal, 2009 on India; Klašnja and Titiunik, 
2017 on Brazil; and Macdonald, 2014 on Zambia). Notably, much of this work has identified an 
incumbency disadvantage in single member district (SMD) plurality settings. But what are the channels and 
mechanisms through which an incumbent (dis)advantage might accrue under a multimember proportional 
representation system like that of Indonesia? 
A recent literature has begun to address this question (Shair-Rosenfield, 2012, Ariga, 2015, Golden and Picci, 
2015, Moral et al., 2015). Theoretically, open-list PR systems should incentivize candidates to cultivate a 
personal reputation (Carey and Shugart, 1995, 418). Shugart et al. (2005), building on Carey and Shugart 
(1995), argue that the choice of open or closed-list systems and district magnitude change the incentives of 
politicians to invest in their personal reputation as a way to attract votes. Under an open-list system, as district 
magnitude rises, candidates are increasingly incentivized to build a personal vote to differentiate themselves 
from competing candidates from the same party (439–440). Under such situations, politicians have incentives 
to use patronage or pork to distribute to the small voter base needed to win seats (Ames, 1995). Incumbents, 
then, use their office to build up advantages in future elections. 
The literature has generally distinguished among three ways incumbency advantage could work (Cox and 
Katz, 1996). First, incumbents have access to legislative resources to build a personal reputation through 
constituency service or other means (King, 1991). Second, higher quality challengers may be deterred from 
contesting elections against incumbents (Levitt and Wolfram, 1997, Ashworth and Mesquita, 2008). And 
third, incumbents may simply be higher quality candidates in the first place, an issue which is subject to 
intense debate (see Green and Krasno, 1988, Jacobson, 1990). While some scholarship incorporates other 
candidate characteristics (such as their public prominence or campaign spending; Green and Krasno, 
1988, Abramowitz, 1988), the most common method measuring quality has been through determining 
whether a candidate had previously held elective office (e.g. Cox and Katz, 1996, Jacobson, 1990).1 
But even as the incentives to cultivate a personal vote increase, politicians face greater difficulties in building 
a personal reputation in PR systems. Credit claiming is difficult in electoral systems with multiple incumbents. 
Golden and Picci (2015, 511), for example, find that Italian legislative candidates receive no personal benefit 
to incumbency, even when individual candidates channeled more public spending and patronage to their 
electoral district.2 The same is presumably true for negative reputations, such as when candidates are known 
to engage in corruption or are blamed for poor district outcomes. Yet this is the mechanism – voter discontent 
with incumbent politician performance in office – that drives at least some of the incumbency penalty found in 
the incumbency disadvantage literature (e.g. Klašnja and Titiunik, 2017, Macdonald, 2014, Uppal, 2009). It 
therefore remains an open question about the extent to which voters in PR systems are able to overcome 
information challenges to link political outcomes to particular politicians. 
In such contexts, we expect that voters rely on information shortcuts when making electoral choices. Shugart 
et al. (2005) examine two heuristics under proportional representation: candidate birthplace and previous 
experience in district electoral office. The former signals the legislator’s “insider knowledge” about the 
                                                          
1 1 Education is another common proxy for candidate skill, though recent work by Carnes and Lupu (2016) casts doubt 
on the validity of education as an indicator of candidate quality. They examine the connection between politicians' level 
of education and a wide variety of political outcomes, including reelection. Among U.S. members of Congress and 
Brazilian mayors, they find that there is little electoral advantage for having a college degree; Brazilian mayors with 
college degrees are 5% more likely to be reelected (pp. 43e44; fn. 15) 
2 There may also be a party effect, where the incumbent party builds an organizational structure that benefits candidates 
regardless of whether they are incumbents (Erikson and Titiunik, 2015, 104), or perhaps builds a local party reputation 
that benefits all the party's candidates. Moral et al (2015) argue that party incumbency is a better measure than personal 
incumbency in PR systems, but their case (Turkey) is a closed-list system. 
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district; and the latter signals capacity and credibility to be responsive to the district’s needs (441). Another 
common information shortcut is where candidates stand on their party list. This heuristic may work in two 
different ways: voters simply choose the first-listed candidate because they have little to no information on the 
candidates (Miller and Krosnick, 1998), or because voters see the party’s ordering of candidates as a form of 
guidance about who is the party’s favored choice (Golden and Picci, 2015, 510). Knowing this, parties can 
enhance or mitigate the effects of incumbency (dis)advantage by where they place incumbents on party 
lists. Shair-Rosenfield (2012) has found that in Indonesia, incumbency benefits female candidates by causing 
them to be ranked lower on the party list than they would otherwise be. 
3. Research design and data 
3.1. Case background 
To investigate the relationship among candidate characteristics, list position, incumbency, and electoral 
success, we use data from the 2014 legislative elections in Indonesia. In April 2014, almost 187 million 
Indonesians voted for national, regional and local representatives (Kotarumalos, 2014). We focus our analysis 
on the electoral contests in Indonesia’s lower house, the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat, or DPR). The 560 seats for the DPR are divided into 77 multi-member constituencies spanning the 
archipelago. Since 2009, Indonesia has used a fully open-list proportional representation system. Each district 
has 3–10 seats, according to district population (IFES, 2014, 1). 
The 2014 elections in Indonesia were the second time that voters participated in open-list elections. The move 
from closed-list to open-list PR has been cited as a key reason that patronage and vote buying practices by 
candidates have become increasingly important as candidates are incentivized to cultivate a personal vote 
(Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016, 12). Another notable change occurred between the 2009 and 2014 legislative 
elections: In 2014, only twelve national parties (and three Aceh province-specific parties) met new threshold 
requirements for contesting the elections, down from thirty-eight national parties (and six Aceh province-
specific parties) in 2009. 
Several aspects of Indonesia’s institutional arrangements are of particular importance to evaluating 
incumbency effects in multimember systems. On election day in 2014, Indonesian voters simultaneously 
voted for four levels of office: the national bodies of the House of Representatives and the Regional 
Representative Council, along with provincial and district/city legislatures. The ballot for the House of 
Representative listed all the candidates fielded by the twelve eligible parties3 allowed to contest the election, 
ranked under each party by list position. Voters could choose to mark either an individual candidate, the party, 
or both, although if the candidate and party did not match then the ballot was considered invalid. Voters 
awarding their votes to individual candidates thus raised the likelihood both that their candidate would win, 
and that the party would win enough votes to receive a seat under the seat allocation process (described 
below). Voters who vote only for the party, however, only raise the likelihood that the party will win a seat, 
but their votes do not count to determine who actually wins the seat from the party list. 
Voting in Indonesia takes place in what might be characterized as a low-information environment. While 
survey data about voter knowledge of legislative candidates are unavailable, other evidence suggests that 
voters face significant challenges in gathering information about candidates. Television is by far the most 
common medium for political information, with 68% of respondents in a 2014 poll watching television every 
day (The Asia Foundation, 2014). Television news is also highly skewed towards national issues and 
campaigns. A sizeable proportion of the survey’s respondents read newspapers and listen to the radio (39% 
and 27% respectively), where they may gather more information about legislative candidates. However, this is 
likely to have limited effects on the aggregate information environment because, as argued by local 
organizations in Indonesia, voters find it difficult to gather information about candidate track records 
(Kristanto and Hari, 2014). 
                                                          
3 3 Voters in the province of Aceh could vote for three additional political parties only allowed to contest in that 
province. 
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Information on candidates in the 2014 election was filed with Indonesia’s electoral commission and made 
accessible via the Indonesia Open Election Project (PemiluAPI). The data provided by PemiluAPI contain 
information on each official candidate’s name, gender, age, religion, birthplace, work and education history, 
party affiliation, electoral district, and list position. Working with the unstructured raw data on educational 
background and work history, two research assistants hand-coded a series of variables that measure the 
educational attainment and professional experience of all 6606 candidates in the 2014 election. Unusually for 
research on personal incumbency, the data include career and educational backgrounds on both incumbents 
and challengers from all parties contesting the election. It is rare that data on losing candidates is available 
(Shugart et al., 2005, 441 fn. 7), and many studies focus on a narrower subset of parties or elections 
(e.g. Golden and Picci, 2015). Using information on the 2009 election, we also determined the incumbency 
status of all registered candidates (more on variable definitions below). 
3.2. Candidate nomination and list position 
The elections law guiding the 2014 elections (Law 8/2012) stipulates that candidate lists should be assigned 
by party officials at the national level (Article 53, paragraph 2). Parties can include on their lists candidates 
with a maximum as the total number of seats in the electoral district (daerah pemilihan, or dapil) (Article 54). 
Parties are required to have 30% female candidates on the party list, and at least one woman among the top 
three candidates on the list (Articles 55–56). In 2004 and 2009, parties in practice failed to meet this 
requirement without serious repercussions (IDEA, 2015, 170). Open-list systems, as the name suggests, allow 
any candidate on the list to be elected. In reality, as elsewhere, in Indonesia list position still appears to play 
an important in voter decisions. For instance, Wardani et al (2013, in IDEA, 2015). find that female 
candidates in a lower list position are more likely to be elected. 
3.3. Seat allocation 
The institutional arrangements guiding the allocation of seats to parties complicate the connection between 
vote share and victory, because it is not always the case that the winners of the highest vote share in the 
district will be awarded a seat. Indonesia uses a multi-stage Hare quota system: The General Election 
Commission (KPU) creates a quota for each dapil, which is the total number of valid votes cast divided by the 
total number of seats in the district. The quota dictates how parties are awarded seats; if for example the quota 
is 1500 votes and the party receives 5000 votes, the party is then awarded three seats. The seats are then 
awarded to the highest vote getters on each party list.4 Any seats remaining are awarded to political parties 
with the largest vote remainders (Ibid). If vote remainder is the same across parties, parties with a wider 
geographical distribution of votes are awarded the seat(s). 
Furthermore, parties which receive under 3.5% of the national vote for the DPR will not gain seats. In 2014, 
two parties, PBB and PKPI, did not meet this threshold, meaning that votes for their candidates or parties were 
invalidated. 
3.4. Measuring incumbency and candidate characteristics 
We define incumbents as candidates who held office at the time of the 2014 election. We focus on three 
candidate characteristics in particular—work experience, education, demographics—in addition to list 
position. 
3.4.1. Work experience, education, and demographics 
Our data allow us to examine a wider variety of candidate background beyond previously holding office. 
Indonesia’s democratic transition has spurred scholars to investigate the extent to which democracy and 
decentralization produced a new breed of reformist, outsider politicians, or simply entrenched authoritarian 
holdovers in local and national politics (e.g. Robison and Hadiz, 2004, Hadiz, 2010, Buehler, 2012). By 
                                                          
4 This example is reproduced exactly from IFES 2014, p. 4. 
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bringing in evidence on candidate work experience, we also connect to this debate about change and 
continuity among the country’s political elite (Poczter and Pepinsky, 2016). 
Importantly, our measures of candidate quality are in line with how at least some Indonesian voters view 
candidates. A 2014 survey of voters before the legislative elections in Indonesia asked respondents to rank ten 
characteristics of candidates; respondents placed educational background and work experience as the two 
most important characteristics of candidates, followed by the candidate’s platform (The Asia Foundation, 
2014). However, we know that voters also respond to issues like age, gender, and religion, much like voters 
around the world. 
3.4.2. List position 
List position is particularly important in Indonesia because party organizations in Indonesia tend not to have 
significant machinery or resources to assist candidates (Aspinall, 2014). List position is thus a finite resource 
with great value for candidates that parties are able to dole out. Indonesia’s poorly resourced parties have a 
history of selling nominations, and most importantly, list position. Mietzner (2007, 251) documented that in 
2004, under a closed-list system, the going rate for nominations was determined according to position, with 
the lowest rankings the most expensive.5 It is unclear the extent to which this still occurs after Indonesia 
moved to an open-list system in 2009. Nevertheless, we expect—given the patterns identified by Mietzner 
(2007) and our theoretical discussion previously—that incumbents will be more likely to be rewarded with 
lower list positions, and that voters will be more likely to choose candidates with low list positions regardless 
of whether or not they are incumbents. 
3.5. Limitations 
Before turning to our empirical analysis, we note here some of the limitations of our data. Like most work on 
incumbency effects, we are unable to measure “direct” effects of personal incumbency: that is, the role of 
constituency service, pork, or patronage. Given the lack of systematic data about legislative practice in 
Indonesia, we cannot ascertain the extent to which this affects voter choices and thus contributes to personal 
incumbency effects. Relatedly, we cannot measure the prevalence of vote buying. Vote buying is a common 
practice in Indonesia’s elections; a 2014 survey by The Asia Foundation found that 36% of respondents had 
experienced vote buying during a legislative election (The Asia Foundation, 2014). The same survey found 
16% of respondents would vote for the candidate who provided money or gifts, while 17% would explicitly 
not choose the party or candidate offering these inducements. It is also unclear ex ante how vote buying is 
related to incumbency in the Indonesian case. It is possible that incumbents have more resources and are thus 
more able to engage in vote buying, but the comparative evidence on the effectiveness of such strategies is 
mixed. Reviewing evidence from field experiments in West Africa, Vicente and Wantchekon (2009) find that 
vote buying is a more effective strategy for challengers rather than incumbents. In contrast, Collier and 
Vicente (2014) argue that, in Nigeria, vote buying (along with ballot fraud) will benefit incumbents as they 
have both the money available and they are more credible in promising clientelism (349, fn. 26). Aspinall 
et al. (2015) find that vote buying is common yet largely ineffective in Indonesian elections, in part because 
the costs are monitoring voters are prohibitively high. 
While list position has been demonstrated to be an important heuristic for voters in low-information 
environments, there are other heuristics that likely play a part in voting behavior that we are not able to 
systematically assess. For instance, Indonesian names frequently offer clues about the ethnic regional, and/or 
religious background of candidates. Finally, campaigners in Indonesian elections often employ campaign 
material that cues ethnic, religious, or other sentiments for voters (Fox and Menchik, 2011). 
Another concern in Indonesian elections is the manipulation of vote results. Concerns in the 2014 election 
were raised about the illegal transferring of votes from one candidate to another, with the assistance of corrupt 
election officials (Rumah Pemilu, 2014: 5). Electoral disputes were submitted to the Constitutional Court, 
which ordered 22 recounts. However, in only one case did the results overturn the previous winner (Della-
                                                          
5 Mietzner's analysis was written prior to the creation of the “fully” open-list PR system in Indonesia in 2009. 
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Giacoma and Junadi, 2014). It is unlikely that electoral fraud is systematic enough that it has significantly 
altered the vote share totals or likelihood of winning in a way that would bias our estimates of incumbency 
effects. 
Finally, our data provide a snapshot of incumbency advantage over a single election in Indonesia. While 
measuring incumbency effects and its changes over time would be ideal, the repeated and sometimes drastic 
changes in electoral rules and guidelines over the elections Indonesia has held since 1998 make it difficult to 
study incumbency effects over time. 
4. Analysis 
4.1. Candidate backgrounds 
The 6606 candidates running in Indonesia’s elections have diverse backgrounds: as activists, celebrities, 
government officials, employees in the private sector, and others. Following the career coding scheme used 
in Poczter and Pepinsky (2016), we coded nineteen different types of career backgrounds (see Table 1). 
Specifically, we looked at every career position listed for every candidate through PemiluAPI, and assigned it 
to a career category. We then aggregated these to the candidate level to code candidates as having experience 
in one or more career categories. As a result, candidates’ career histories are not mutually exclusive; for 
instance, candidates with experience in both local government and in the private sector receive a “1” for the 
dummy variables local government and private sector. 
Table 1. Career backgrounds of 2014 legislative candidates. 
 
Table 2. Other candidate characteristics. 
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These data are useful for characterizing the social backgrounds of Indonesian legislative candidates, and can 
be used to illustrate change over time. Mietzner (2007: 257) found that in 2004, 39.8% of all national 
parliamentary members had business backgrounds; we find that among winning candidates in 2014, 56% had 
a background as a businessperson. This shows the relative rise of the private sector as a route to a political 
career. 
Table 2 covers a series of additional candidate characteristics of interest that we obtained from PemiluAPI. 
A large majority (86%) of candidates had some form of higher education. The religious background of 
parliamentary candidates roughly reflects the distribution of religious affiliations in the general population, 
with Muslim candidates constituting the vast majority (84%). Importantly, despite efforts to increase the 
number of women in parliament using quotas, only about 37% of candidates are female. 
4.2. Incumbency 
Seven percent of all candidates running in the 2014 elections were incumbents. All of the 77 electoral districts 
had more than one incumbent contesting in the district, often from the same party, with an average of 6.3 
incumbents running in each dapil. The number of incumbents seeking reelection between the last two 
legislative elections has increased. In the 2009 election, 34% of incumbents from 2004 chose not to run (or 
were excluded by the party from) the ballot list (Buehler and Vermonte, 2012, 6–7). In 2014, only 13% of 
incumbents did not appear again on a party list.6 Importantly for our analysis below, incumbents were 
generally given low list positions: 56% of incumbents were ranked first in the party list; 24% in second place; 
6% in third, and 7% in fourth. 
4.3. Election results 
The data show how difficult it is to win a commanding share of the vote in Indonesia’s fragmented system. 
Only 53 of the 6606 candidates received more than 10% of the vote, and the average winning candidate won 
only 5.45% of the vote. Not surprisingly, candidates at low list positions tended to win the most votes. This 
was true among candidates from within the same party; the correlation between list position and where 
candidates stood in terms of their ranking in total votes earned was 0.73. It was also true across 
parties; Fig. 1 displays histograms of candidates’ vote shares by list position.7 The x-axis shows the 
distribution of vote shares and the y-axis the proportion of candidates in each vote share bin. Panel 1 – 
showing the distribution of vote shares for candidates with list position 1– indicates that top-ranked 
candidates’ vote shares are fairly evenly distributed between zero and ten percent. As candidates move down 
in list position, the distribution of vote shares becomes much more concentrated around a zero percent vote 
share, as shown in panels 2–10. In fact, candidates ranked in the third – tenth position in their party lists were 
unlikely to be elected. 
Another way to think about the benefit of incumbency is to consider whether incumbents are more likely to be 
the candidates who win the most votes within their party in any particular dapil. If incumbency is defined 
broadly (including both those who held the seat at some point in the previous term or held the seat at the time 
of the election, n = 488), 48% of incumbents received the most votes of any candidate in their party; 27% 
received the second highest vote share of any candidate in their party. 
Fig. 2 provides further evidence on the role incumbency played for candidates’ electoral success. The figure 
displays kernel density estimates for candidates’ vote shares for incumbents (solid line) and non-incumbents 
(dashed line). The distribution of vote shares for incumbents strongly differs from non-incumbents, indicating, 
                                                          
6 The incumbents themselves are also self-selected; it is possible that incumbents who perceived their chances as poor, 
possibly because of corruption scandals, poor performance, or inability to use the resources of office to their advantage, 
decided not to run again. 
7 To improve the visualization, we excluded the top 1% of vote shares (i.e., above 10%) 
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across the board, higher final vote shares. On average, incumbent candidates receive 4.16% of the vote, 
whereas the average non-incumbent only received 0.93% of the vote. 
Fig. 1. Vote shares by list position. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Candidate vote share by incumbency status. 
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4.4. Testing the effects of incumbency and list position 
The descriptive plot in Fig. 2 is suggestive evidence of an incumbency advantage in Indonesian legislative 
elections. In this section, we turn to regression analysis to further substantiate this finding. Specifically, we 
assess the relationship between incumbency status and three core outcomes: candidate vote share, list position, 
and whether the candidate won a seat. Vote share and winning a seat are the two best outcome measures for 
measuring incumbency effects. But we also consider list position, because this variable might be an 
intermediate outcome that can be part of the mechanism that links incumbency status to either vote share or 
winning a seat. Incumbents can use their political influence and electoral viability to extract a low list position 
from the party, which contributes to electoral success. 
In order to estimate the effect of incumbency we must also consider confounding factors. In particular, the 
established literature on incumbency affects has drawn attention to the problem of separating candidate ability 
from incumbency status when estimating the effects of incumbency itself. Most recently, empirical analyses 
have relied on regression discontinuity designs to identify the causal effect of incumbency. Due to the lack of 
data on a second round of elections, we are unable to implement such a design. Instead, we rely on regression 
adjustment to distinguish candidate quality from incumbency. 
Specifically, we estimate regression models of the following form:yid=αd+βIid+γXid+εidwhere yid is a 
measure of one of our three outcomes, αd is an electoral district fixed effect, and Xid is a vector of observable 
candidate characteristics. Iid, our main variable of interest, is a dummy variable that captures whether 
candidate i is an incumbent in district d.8 This model specification accounts for important district-level 
confounders, like district magnitude and baseline levels of party support, via the inclusion of the district fixed 
effects. To limit confounding via candidate quality we include an extensive battery of candidate-level 
variables that capture those candidate characteristics that might proxy for candidate quality – in particular 
variables measuring educational background and work history. We include an indicator that measures the 
level of educational attainment of each candidate, ranging from 1 (elementary school) to 4 (higher education). 
                                                          
8 For our main analysis we rely on a narrow definition of incumbency, i.e., candidates who currently hold a seat. For our 
robustness checks we also consider the slightly broader definition of incumbency, which also includes candidates who 
used to be incumbents but vacated their seat in the five year period prior to the 2014 election. This probably dilutes our 
estimate of the strength of incumbency advantage, since candidates that abandoned their seats before the election have 
fewer resources attached to their office to draw on. 
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We also include dummy variables for our work history categories. These cover a multitude of experiences, 
ranging from government service, to civil society work, private sector experience, to celebrity status. In 
addition to educational background and work history, we include candidate age as well as dummy variables 
for female gender, candidates’ party affiliation, and religion. Taken together, this rich set of candidate-level 
controls should account for a large portion of candidate quality, party label effects, or unobserved district 
characteristics that might confound the effect of incumbency. Summary statistics for all variables are reported 
in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
For vote share and list position we estimate standard OLS models with electoral district fixed effects and 
standard errors clustered at the electoral district level to account for arbitrary serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity. For the dummy variable that measures whether a candidate actually won a seat, we 
estimate a logistic regression model. 
Table 3 presents our main results. Before we discuss the effects of incumbency, we briefly highlight the 
results for some particularly interesting control variables. We find, first, that female candidates are penalized 
across the board. They receive a smaller share of the vote, receive a worse (i.e., higher) list position, and have 
an overall lower probability of winning a seat. We see a similar bias against older candidates. Educational 
background seems to matter less – our indicator has a statistically significant relationship with list position at 
the 5% level, but not with any of the other outcomes. Looking at a candidate’s work history, a number of 
factors stand out as relevant predictors of electoral success and list position. Experience in local government 
or as a parliamentarian or minister each significantly increase vote share, improve list position, and elevate the 
probability of winning a seat. Religious affiliation does not seem to exert large effects. Although Christian 
candidates receive, on average, a worse list position, this does not affect their vote share or probability of 
winning a seat. Last, our set of party affiliation dummies capture any overall party label effects on individual 
candidates’ vote shares. These effects have to interpreted with respect to the omitted party category of Golkar 
– the former ruling party during the New Order regime. As can be seen, affiliation with any of the other 
parties, except PDI-P, carries a penalty for candidate’s vote share. This is not too surprising, since Golkar and 
PDI-P are two of Indonesia’s most established parties. 
Turning to our main variable of interest, our indicator for incumbency is positive and statistically significant 
for vote share and winning a seat. The effect of incumbency is negative and statistically significant for list 
position (because lower list positions are better). Substantively, incumbents can expect to receive a vote share 
that is higher by 2.67 percentage points than non-incumbents. That is about 1.4 standard deviations. Given 
that the average seat winning vote share was 5.45%, this is a substantively meaningful effect. They are also, 
on average, ranked two list positions better than other candidates and the overall probability of winning a seat 
is about 25 percentage points higher for incumbents (the baseline probability of winning is only 8.5%). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 12 
 
 
Table 3. Incumbency advantage, main results. 
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Our appendix shows models that test the robustness of this finding. For example, since candidate vote share is 
bound between 0 and 1, we estimate a fractional logit model with electoral district dummies. As an alternative 
to the logit model, we also estimate a linear probability model, with no substantive changes to our results 
(see Table A2 and A3 in the Appendix). We also broaden the definition of incumbency to include candidates 
who relinquished their seat before the election but decided to run again. Similarly, we also estimate a model 
with a categorical definition of incumbency that separates these different types of incumbents (see Tables A4 
and A5 in the Appendix). 
Table 4 further explores how incumbency and list position work together to realize incumbency advantage. 
The first two columns estimate the vote share models and the logit model for winning a seat, but include as an 
additional control the list position of the candidate. Since list position is post-treatment with respect to 
incumbency status, these regressions only estimate the partial effect of incumbency, after having already 
accounted for the effect of list position. Again, we find a statistically significant effect of incumbency status. 
Moreover, coefficients in Table 4 are smaller than those in Table 3 (2.19 versus 2.66 for vote share, 1.32 
versus 2.24 for winning a seat). This suggests that list position captures come of the effects of incumbency, 
but the incumbency advantage effect is realized to a large extent independently of list position. Models (3) and 
(4) in Table 4 estimate the same models but also include an interaction term between list position and 
incumbency status. To judge the statistical and substantive importance of the interaction, Fig. 3 displays the 
predicted vote share for incumbents and non-incumbents by list position, based on Model (3). 
Table 4. Incumbency advantage, interaction models. 
 
Fig. 3 shows that incumbents receive a higher vote share than non-incumbents for low list positions. Similarly, 
lower list position statistically significantly reduces candidates’ vote share. Importantly, the positive effect of 
being an incumbent is more dramatic for top list positions. This difference in slope itself is statistically 
significant and suggests that incumbency is amplified by list position. This difference in effects becomes 
smaller and eventually statistically insignificant for higher list positions – in part because few incumbents 
receive poor list positions. In other words, incumbents that enjoy a low list position do particularly well, while 
highly placed candidates – incumbent or not – do poorly. For example, of the 34 incumbents who received a 
list position of five or higher, only three won a seat. This success rate of 9% is roughly comparable to the 
success rate of non-incumbents of similar list position, who won a seat at a rate of 2%.9 
Finally, we provide some exploratory evidence on the heterogeneity of incumbency advantage. We estimate a 
series of interaction models for final vote share, in which we interact our incumbency measure with 
candidates’ gender, educational background, party affiliation, religion, and district magnitude. Detailed 
regression results are provided in Table A7 in the Appendix; here we simply highlight the most interesting 
findings. 
 
                                                          
9 These success rates are based purely on descriptive statistics and do not account for other aspects of candidates' profiles 
that affect the success probability as estimated in our multivariate models. As Fig. 3 illustrates, the probability of winning 
a seat at list position 5 is basically the same for incumbents and non-incumbents 
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Fig. 3. Incumbency, list position, and vote share. 
 
First, on partisan and district characteristics. We find that incumbency advantage is particularly weak for 
candidates from the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI), the Crescent Star Party (PBB), and the 
Democrat Party (PD) – relative to the baseline category of a Golkar candidate. PD’s low level of incumbency 
advantage is probably due to the collapse of the party’s electoral support as a whole at the end of President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s presidency. Candidates from the NasDem party are even subject to a negative 
incumbency effect relative to a Golkar candidate; NasDem was founded only in 2011, but it does have a few 
incumbents who had switched parties to join the party prior to 2014. Conversely, incumbency advantage is 
large and positive for candidates from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and Golkar (effect 
sizes between candidates from Golkar and PDI-P are statistically indistinguishable from each other). One 
explanation for these differential results is party institutionalization: PDI-P and Golkar are two of Indonesia’s 
oldest political parties, PDI-P being a successor to PDI, an opposition party created in the early years of 
Indonesia’s New Order regime (1966–1998) and Golkar being the former autocratic ruling party. The other 
parties except for PPP were all founded after 1998, with NasDem the newest, dating only to 2011. Similar 
to Moral et al. (2015) in Turkey, we also find that incumbency advantage is much smaller in districts with 
higher district magnitude. This might reflect the additional opportunities for otherwise marginal challengers to 
succeed in such elections, since voters may have less information about the reputation of incumbents. 
Turning to candidates’ individual characteristics, we do not find any differences in incumbency effects 
between female and male candidates. Thus, whereas Shair-Rosenfield (2012) identifies incumbency as an 
important determinant of women’s electoral success using data from Indonesia’s 2009 legislative elections, 
looking at the 2014 legislative elections we find that female candidates are no more likely to benefit from 
incumbency than are men, conditional on the other covariates we have include in our models.10 
Given the strong connection between list position and vote share, it is perhaps surprising that parties do not 
always place incumbents at the top of the party list. There are several reasons why parties do not do so. First, 
parties may reward candidates with low list positions in response to unobserved candidate characteristics such 
as party loyalty (Golden and Picci, 2015) or personal connections. It is also possible that, as under the closed-
list system, challengers are simply buying low list positions. 
Yet another possibility is parties strategically choose to place some incumbents in higher list positions. If 
parties believe that an incumbent has a reputation for being corrupt or incompetent, or pre-election survey 
results (increasingly common in Indonesia, see Mietzner, 2009) indicate that a more popular candidate than 
the incumbent has entered the race, then they will push the incumbent further up the list. If parties believe 
incumbents are somehow tainted in the eyes of the public, they should push them to higher list positions. In 
theory, it is also possible that parties are trying to maximize total party votes in order to gain the most number 
                                                          
10 If we exclude all covariates and simply include female gender, incumbency, and their interaction as predictors, we still 
find no evidence that female candidates are more likely to benefit from incumbency than men. 
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of seats, no matter who wins the seat. Although we have no evidence that this has occurred in Indonesia, 
placing popular incumbents at higher list positions might lead parties to place popular but untried candidates 
at lower positions. Unfortunately, we are unable to systematically evaluate the motivations of parties in how 
they place candidates. 
Given the lack of systematic data, we cannot test whether or how incumbents are using the resources of office 
to increase their likelihood of winning a seat. Certainly, field research from the 2014 elections has found that 
legislative candidates sought to build up their personal reputation in order to boost their vote share (Aspinall 
and Sukmajati, 2016). Incumbents also benefit from heuristics such as better list position and name 
recognition (for example through newspaper and television coverage throughout their terms), complementing 
direct constituency service or campaign effects. The finding that incumbency effects diminish as district 
magnitude grows also suggests that the reach of personally-centered campaigns, including patronage, has its 
limits. Research on clientelism and vote buying in Indonesia and in other contexts suggests this to be the case 
(see discussion in Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016, 35.) 
Our finding of a personal incumbency advantage in Indonesia naturally raises another question. Why would 
Indonesia not conform to expectations of an incumbency disadvantage as found in other new democracies? 
We highlight three factors. First, the role of information shortcuts among voters looms large. Faced with long 
lists of candidates, many of whom have tried to build personal (not party) reputations, voters may default to 
using incumbency, list position, name recognition, gender, or other heuristics to make their decisions. Second, 
given widespread reports and research suggesting the ubiquity of patronage and vote buying, incumbents are 
better positioned to distribute resources to build up their vote. Third, it is also possible that Indonesia’s 
national legislators are not penalized for poor performance in the way that the new incumbency disadvantage 
literature predicts. The national legislature is not held in high regard by ordinary Indonesians. A 2014 poll by 
the respected LSI survey institute found that 37% of survey respondents reported having not much or no 
confidence at all in the national legislature to address issues in their community and country, and respondents 
rated it as being the most corrupt institution in the country (LSI, 2014). At the same time, national legislators 
are often distant from the issues affecting quality of life in their districts. The decisions over infrastructure, 
road provision, civil service hiring, and other issues directly affecting voters are under the purview of local or 
regional politicians: governors, mayors, district heads, and district legislatures, in the case of Indonesia. While 
Indonesian voters may not have a high regard for national legislators, they may not have enough information 
about their behavior, or see them as responsible for poor local outcomes, to penalize them during elections. 
5. Conclusion 
This article has documented a strong personal incumbency advantage in Indonesia’s open-list PR system. We 
have also shown that personal incumbency is mediated by how parties choose to rank incumbents and 
challengers on their party lists, and also by candidate characteristics. This analysis, the first of its kind in 
Indonesia, suggests several new areas of research on incumbency effects in new democracies and in open-list 
PR systems. 
Most importantly, our contributions open an avenue into further research on personal incumbency that looks 
more systematically and comprehensively at candidates’ personal and professional backgrounds. While 
having previously held elective office offers a compelling proxy for candidate quality, we have shown that 
other aspects of candidate background such as education or other types of work history affect can affect 
incumbency as well. Our rich data on incumbent and challenger characteristics allow us to investigate how 
these interact with incumbency status and list position in open-list PR systems. Going forward, we see the 
central question to be not whether or not an incumbency advantage exists in open-list PR systems such as 
Indonesia, but where it comes from. 
Our findings also naturally help us to better understand the trajectory of democratic consolidation in countries 
like Indonesia, where scholars have engaged in debates over change and continuity among the country’s 
political elite since its democratic transition. Our findings depart from the majority of recent published work 
that finds evidence of an incumbency disadvantage in new democracies (see a critical review in Fowler and 
Hall, 2016). The Indonesian case appears to be more typical of advanced industrial democracies: incumbency 
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offers a consistent advantage to candidates for legislative elections, one that cannot be reduced to any 
systematically observable candidate characteristics. 
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